Many websites act as relying parties (RPs) by allowing access to their services via third-party identity providers (IDPs), such as Facebook and Google. Using IDPs simplifies account creation, login activity, and information sharing across websites. However, different websites' use of IDPs can have significant security and privacy implications for users. Here, the authors provide an overview of third-party identity management's current landscape. Using datasets collected through manual identification and large-scale crawling, they answer questions related to which sites act as RPs, which sites are the most successful IDPs, and how different classes of RPs select their IDPs.
W
ith third-party single sign-on (SSO) services, regular websites such as Huffington Post can allow their users to quickly and easily create personalized user accounts and to login to their site using a user's already existing account with a popular third-party provider. In a third-party SSO scenario, Huffington Post, for example, presents the user with the option of using his or her existing account(s) with Facebook, Twitter, or other third-party identity providers (IDPs) for authentication. Having selected Facebook, for example, the user is directed to Facebook for authentication. In this example, Huffington Post is the relying party (RP), and Facebook is the IDP. Together, RPs and IDPs make up the third-party identity management landscape.
Today, IDPs are also being used for sharing personal information across websites. 1 In our example, users are asked if they want to share information from their Facebook account with Huffington Post. Use of the OAuth (authorization) protocol can also enable RPs to post information to the user's IDP account on behalf of the user. Cross-site sharing of personal information can be used to simplify or improve the user's experience, but these services also introduce privacy and security concerns. [1] [2] [3] The increasing entanglement of RPs and IDPs has implications for end users, as their personal information can flow both ways.
The RP-IDP landscape continues to evolve, and surprisingly not much is known about which sites are the most frequent IDP users and about how dif-ferent types of RPs select their IDPs. The RPs and their IDP selection play a particularly important role in this emerging landscape. Not only are RPs affecting the IDP choices provided to end users, but as the RPs implement the RP-IDP communication, they directly impact the potential information that might move between sites, and hence also the privacy risks faced by end users. The impact of IDP choices made by the RPs is further illustrated by different IDPs offering different APIs, authentication/authorization protocols, security levels, and information exchange possibilities. Here, we fill this void by presenting a measurement-driven analysis of the RP-IDP landscape.
With this analysis, we first characterize RPs and other crawled websites. Second, we identify and characterize the most popular IDPs. Third, we characterize which IDPs are selected by different classes. Breaking down the usage within classes of websites, we provide insights into differences in the usage of these services within and across classes. We also consider questions surrounding why there are so many RPs and so few IDPs, how these IDPs are being used, and why some IDPs are more popular than others. Finally, we use longitudinal data to capture current trends in the third-party identity management landscape.
Background
Let's begin by discussing some of the basics of third-party identity management. Figure 1 highlights key aspects of its evolution.
Protocol Usage
The major protocols for third-party authentication today are OpenID (http://openid.net/) and OAuth (http://oauth.net/). OpenID is an open standard for Web-SSO, while OAuth (which also provides SSO) primarily is an authorization protocol that lets a user authorize an application on one site to act on behalf of the user on another site. Compared with OpenID, OAuth allows for richer cross-site sharing and more flexible design. The richer information has privacy implications 1 and the flexible design can easily result in security flaws of individual implementations. 4 OpenID Connect combines OpenID with OAuth. Security Assertion Markup Language (SAML) SSO is another emerging standard, but this isn't yet visible in our datasets. Google added OpenID support to its own protocol in 2008, shortly followed by OAuth support. Microsoft has a long history of running its own proprietary protocols, and over the years has faced several security problems. 
Influential Players

Related Work
Security weaknesses have been identified in both OAuth and OpenID. 4, 6 However, perhaps the biggest weakness in SSO is the implementation of the protocols themselves. 4 For example, Rui Wang and his colleagues 3 identified eight serious logical flaws that allowed an attacker to sign on as the victim user of a number of high-profile IDPs and RPs. Rachna Dhamija and Lisa Dusseault 2 describe seven flaws in federated identity management solutions, each relating to issues such as security, privacy, usability, and economic factors. Other works have considered or characterized specific privacy, 7 usability, 8 and economic 9 aspects of SSO services. Pure OpenID-based solutions (which only provide authentication, not authorization as with OAuth), offer little incentive to act as an RP. 10 While several large IDPs have tried OpenID as part of their protocol, many websites instead use OAuth-based IDPs. 8, 11 As shown by our longitudinal dataset, this has resulted in an upswing in IDP usage.
In contrast to the aforementioned works, we use a measurement-driven analysis to characterize the observed third-party IDP landscape.
Datasets and Relationship Identification
Now, we detail how we collected our datasets to identify relationships.
Manually Identified Top 200 Datasets
We collected datasets by careful manual classification of site-to-site relationships of a large number of potential RP-IDP identified by ourselves, Web crawlers, and student volunteers. We use this dataset to attempt to identify all relationships involving the top 200 Alexa websites (www.alexa. com) at the time of data collection, collected at six different time instances between April 2012 and February 2014.
Large-Scale Dataset (Identified through Crawling)
We used popularity-based logarithmic sampling to pick a carefully selected sample set with 35,619 websites from the million most popular websites according to Alexa. We used logarithmic sampling because website popularity is known to be longtailed. 12 We then used our multithreaded Selenium-based (http://seleniumhq.org) crawler 11 to go through these sites and identify RP-IDP relationships, while acting like a human user that clicks on the available GUI elements, reacts to popups, and takes other GUI-based actions.
Although our tool doesn't find all RP-IDP relationships, our manual validation has shown that the tool is successful in avoiding false positives.
11
Out of the 35,619 sampled websites, we found 1,865 RPs, 50 IDPs, and 3,329 unique RP-IDP relationships.
Complementing Information
During our large-scale crawl, we collected information about internal and external links, internal and external objects, and other general site statistics found at different levels of the website design. In total, the crawl included the download of 1.4 × 10 8 objects (totaling 1.6 terabytes), and identifying and analyzing 2.5 × 10 7 links. For all sampled sites and the sites with which the sampled sites have third-party relationships, we also used complementing scripts to obtain additional ownership and geographic information. Figure 2 shows the RP-IDP relationships that we manually identified pertaining to the 200 most popular websites and all IDPs used by these sites. Note that the hierarchy is relatively flat, with a few popular IDPs, such as Facebook (see Figures 2c and 2d) dominating the usage, and very few hybrid websites (such as blogger.com). Yet, as illustrated by the Chinese cluster (Figure 2b ), the existence of multiple hybrids can allow for more complex structures and increased depths. We also observed that Chinese RPs almost exclusively select Chinese IDPs. 11 However, it's unclear how much of this is due to censorship-related restrictions.
Landscape Overview
The high usage of popular social IDPs such as Facebook adds value to both the IDPs and the passwords associated with these IDPs. For example, even if the user doesn't have an account on a specific RP, an attacker knowing the user's IDP password can easily impersonate the user on any RP using that IDP. IDPs with a higher node degree can become increasingly targeted by potential attackers.
Current State: RPs and Their IDPs
Next, we applied our methodology.
Methodology Overview
We applied a basic methodology. First, during data collection, we identified RP-IDP relationships and other site characteristics for selected sample websites. Second, we classified the sampled site along four dimensions (summarized and explained in the following section). Third, we used hypothesis testing to identify website classes more likely to act as RPs.
Website Classification
When classifying websites, we took the following approach.
Primary service. We manually labeled the top 200 websites (and their IDPs) into one of eight service classes: social/portal, tech, commerce, news, video, info, file sharing, ads, and content delivery network (CDN). The classes used here are more carefully explained in earlier work. 11, 12 Popularity segment. We classified websites based on to which popularity segment they belong after taking the logarithm of the Alexa site rank. For this study, we defined five classes: [ ]. We applied logarithmic transformation because ranks follow power-law distributions, 12 ensuring that each popularity segment is well represented.
Geographic region. While we considered a wide range of geographic measures, and our conclusions regarding potential geographic biases appear to hold true in general, for the purpose of this article we combined two measures. First, we used a geolocation service to determine the servers' locations. Second, we used statistics provided by Alexa to estimate the region in which their primary user audience is located. While neither of these two measures provides an objective quantification of the number of websites that are from a particular region, both measures allowed us to place each site in one of six regions: North America, Europe, Asia, South America, Africa, and Oceania. If both measures mapped to the same region, we classified a website to North America, Europe, Asia, or Other region. Otherwise, we classified the website as Mixed/unknown. Byte/link volume. We also classified sites based on quantifiable metrics such as the number of links, objects, and bytes associated with different depths of the website. First, we performed a principal component analysis (PCA). (The PCA was based on six log-transformed metrics -the number of links, objects, and bytes associated with the first page, as well as the same metrics as measured down to a depth two from the first page -each with variances normalized to one.) Who Are the RPs? Table 1 shows the site types that are the most frequent RPs in the manual and crawled datasets, respectively, as well as for the subset of the crawled dataset that corresponds to the top 200 sites. Table  2 shows the site types with the relatively highest portion of RPs, for the same datasets. The data for the top 200 sites helped validate the crawled dataset. For example, seven out of eight of the top categories are the same for the top 200 sites (the first two columns in each row). The results only differ for the geographic region with the largest fraction of sites being RPs (Table 2) . This difference is in part due to the crawler being somewhat more cautious in classifying some Asian websites. However, it should be noted that North America is only 3 percent behind Asia in the manual dataset. (In the crawl/top 200 dataset, Asia is 14 percent behind North America.) We've shown that the crawler carefully and successfully avoids false positives. 11 This is reflected in the lower number of RP sites (Table 1 ) and percentages of sites that are RPs (Table 2 ) observed using the crawl/top 200 relative to the manual dataset.
Comparing the results for the full crawled dataset and for the top 200 sites, we note that the RPs in the top 200 typically are lighter in their design, as indicated by the difference in byte/link volume. It should also be noted that the impact of popularity is best evaluated when using the full crawled dataset.
Motivated by the aforementioned observations, we focus the remaining analysis on the crawled dataset when available (by popularity segment, geographic region, and byte/link volume), and the manual dataset otherwise (by primary service).
We observe that the typical RP, as defined by the most frequently observed RP classes (Table 1) , is often of the same classes as the typical (most frequently observed) sample site. For example, social websites are the most common class on the top 200 list (84 out of 200), more websites map to North America than any other region (8,188 out of 35,619), most websites belong to the long tail of less-popular websites, and by definition most sites will be classified as (V−, L−). Perhaps more interestingly, the website classes that are most likely to use at least one third-party IDP (Table 2) differ from the most frequently observed RP classes.
Using our site classification, the classes most likely to be an RP are as follows: sites covering news, sites among the top 1,000 most popular, sites located in Asia, and sites belonging to the (V+, L+) category of heavy sites with a lot of content (V+) and links (L+). Here, we only present our key findings and highlight the classes that showed significantly higher IDP usage, in particular the classes for which we have at least 99 percent confidence with our hypothesis tests. The details of the hypothesis testing can be found in our extended version (www.ida.liu.se/~nikca89/papers/ic15.pdf). First, although the manual dataset, for which we manually label websites based on their primary service, only covers 200 websites, the much higher than average IDP usage among news sites is significant (≥ 99 percent confidence). Out of the 17 news sites in the top 200 dataset, 11 (65 percent) acted as RP, which can be contrasted against the overall averages of 69/200 (35 percent) among the top 200 websites. In total, these news site RPs had 29 RP-IDP relationships, with a total of 7 unique IDPs.
The news sites are interesting because they often use popular social IDPs (such as Facebook and Twitter) to incentivize sharing content, comments, and popular articles, thereby increasing readership. User information from these social IDPs might also be used to help personalize and improve the user experience; for example, by providing targeted news stories and commercial ads. The last point is supported by the frequent use of easy-to-integrate login-widgets from Gigya that allow easy collection of personal information from multiple IDPs.
Second, the popular sites (the top 10,000) have a significantly higher IDP usage. For example, using our large-scale (automatic) dataset, for which we conservatively identify that on average 5.2 percent of the sampled sites are RPs, we observe that among the top 1,000 websites 12 percent of the sampled sites are RPs. Also, the IDP usage in popularity segments (10 3 , 10 4 ] is significant, with 8.9 percent of the sites identified as RPs. The significant skew toward popular sites using IDPs is interesting in that a larger fraction of these sites appears up-to-date, using more Web 2.0 features, and hence indicating that they might be early adopters. Third, both North American (6.7 percent) and Asian (8.4 percent) sites appear to be significant IDP users. Finally, the heaviest sites, with (V+, L+ ) or (V+ , L−), have significant (12.1 percent and 10.7 percent) IDP usage.
Who Are the Popular IDPs? Table 3 summarizes the top 10 most popular IDPs in our dataset, the Alexa ranks of these services, the primary protocol used for third-party authentication, and the number of (sampled) RPs that these IDPs help. The low Alexa rank for vkontakte.ru is largely due to a domain name change (to vk.com, with an Alexa rank of 41), as many RPs use the old domain name.
Use of popular sites as IDPs is dominant, because these already have a large number of users with active accounts. In addition, in many cases, these sites might already have access to large amounts of personal information that could help the RP improve their personalization and service. No specialized IDP makes the top 10 list, the OpenID usage is small, and the use of the general OpenID field (which lets the user input any OpenID provider) is only used by 87 of the 35,619 sampled sites (and 1,865 RPs). Instead, OAuth is the dominating protocol. Among the top 10 IDPs, eight IDPs use OAuth as their primary protocol and nine use OAuth for some of their relationships. This high OAuth usage can lead to significant cross-site information leakage, with privacy implications for the users. 1 
The Evolving RP-IDP Landscape
There are a few dominant IDPs that are widely used across almost all classes of websites. For example, Facebook is the most popular IDP in 19 of the 21 single-dimension website classes defined in the "Website Classification" section (with tech and Asian sites being the only exceptions). In addition to acting as an IDP for many websites, these popular IDPs often have access to much personal information, making them a potential security and privacy concern for users. Because information is shared with ad services, these concerns will continue to increase. However, the high popularity and visibility of these IDPs ensures that Increasingly, many RPs select popular IDPs solutions that offer OAuth-based services that allow the RP to perform actions on the IDP and share information across sites, on behalf of the user. This trend has further increased the skew toward high-degree nodes such as Facebook (for example, Figure 2d ). For example, over the duration of the study (between April 2012 and February 2014), the use of Facebook increased from 44 to 52 RPs (18 percent) on the top 200 list. Similarly, Twitter and QQ increased from 15 to 19 (27 percent) and from nine to 14 (56 percent), respectively. The biggest upswing was observed for Sina/Weibo, which increased from five to 13 RPs (160 percent).
Although we observed a small cluster of professional IDP services (see Figure 2c ) used mostly by the top 200 sites, this cluster has been shrinking with time. For example, over the study's duration, the number of specialized RP-IDP relationships among the top 200 sites decreased from 13 to three; or eight to one if we don't count the general OpenID field. In fact, during this time, ClaimID, Vidoop, Clickpass, and MyOpenID all went out of business. Verisign's Personal Identity Portal (PIP) service (now owned by Symantec) is the only specialized pro-IDP that we've observed among the top 200 websites, which remain in business, at least for the near future.
Another interesting trend is that the Chinese cluster (Figure 2b ) has become even more clustered (with the addition of more relationships and hybrid nodes) and disconnected from the other top 200 sites. While the original dataset had six relationships to IDPs outside the cluster (all to Live, owned by Microsoft), five of these six relationships were dropped around the time of the Snowden scandal in late 2013.
Finally, the negligible use of federated protocols 13 and a high skew in IDP selection effectively results in a single point of failure, with both the users and RPs becoming dependent on the IDPs' authentication services being available 24/7. Also, with these IDPs often being used for fastand-easy everyday login to social networks, the users might not realize the full risks associated with these passwords.
I
n looking at our class-based analysis that characterizes the third-party IDP landscape, we discovered some interesting trends.
At a high level, the typical (most frequently observed) RPs are North American sites and often belong to the long tail of less-popular sites. In contrast, the sites that are the most likely to act as RPs are news sites, the 1,000 most popular sites, and Asian-hosted sites. Using hypothesis testing, we found that these sites show a significant bias for using IDPs relative to other sites. We also found that most classes of sites, when selecting to act as RP, have a similar IDP usage and are often dominated by heavy Facebook usage. Except Asian sites, which are QQ-dominated, and tech sites, which use specialized IDPs to a larger extent than others, most other classes differ primarily in their secondary IDPs. For example, the common use of a Gigya widget among news sites results in a more balanced IDP usage than seen in other classes. These three classes (Asian, tech, and news sites) are particularly interesting, as they appear to be among the early adopters, but all substantially differ in their characteristics and IDP selection behavior.
We observe heavy bias, across website classes, toward selecting popular social IDPs, such as Facebook, Twitter, and QQ. The heavy skew in usage toward a few popular IDPs places high trust on these IDPs. Not only does a compromised IDP account give access to the user's RP accounts, but the broad usage of these IDPs also indirectly allows an attacker to easily and quickly impersonate the user across all types of Web services. Unfortunately, what makes these third-party services attractive for the RPs also can make the set of RP-IDP relationships attractive to attackers. 
